The Noble Lie: ethical considerations and the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War

The Noble Lie: ethical considerations and the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War

‘The 2003 war in Iraq is important because it represents the first

time a group of intervening states have justified their actions by referring to the humanitarian outcomes that were produced by acts primarily motivated by non-humanitarian concerns’ (Bellamy 2004)

Introduction

Although there can be no doubt of Saddam Hussein’s “vicious inhumanity,” in light of the quarter of a million murdered or “disappeared” Iraqis during his last twenty-five years of Ba’th Party rule, there is also little dispute that by March 2003 Hussein’s killings were waning (Roth 2004). As many critics of the war are increasingly eager to note, justifying the war in Iraq as a ‘humanitarian intervention’ is a difficult case to make¹. In fact, several of the most respected humanitarian organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have criticised the US administration’s humanitarian claims, suggesting that they threaten the legitimacy of future ‘valid’ humanitarian interventions (ibid). However, without casting judgement on whether the 2003 war in Iraq was a ‘humanitarian intervention’, the question remains as to why US officials ascribed such a prominent position to ethical considerations in the lead up to the war. The most prominent and critical explanation proposes that U.S. ethical claims were merely a ‘smokescreen created by Bush in order to camouflage other secret goals in Iraq,’ (Tunc 2005: 348) namely oil and imperial expansion.

Like all conflicts, a number of factors undoubtedly motivated the U.S. administration’s decision to go to war, and as Michael Ignatieff (2003) has judiciously suggested, ‘oil is not the whole story.’ As this essay contends, using ethical considerations to legitimise actual strategic motives is an important, but not complete, depiction of the Bush administration’s neoconservative agenda. While justifying intervention in Iraq on the basis of the democratic freedoms and human rights of Iraqis, may have been a means to obscure the U.S.’s bellicose ulterior motives, ethical considerations are also a primary goal and an intrinsic facet of the neoconservative theory reflected in the Bush doctrine (Mearsheimer 2005: 1). The 2002 National Security Strategy clearly promotes a foreign policy ‘that reflects the union of our values and our national interests’ (Bush 2002: 1). Thus the neoconservative idea that ‘effectively link[s] morality […]’ in the form of human rights and democracy, ‘to a strategic purpose (defeating terrorism)’ (Heinze 2006: 21) played an important role in the decision to intervene in Iraq. Consequently, ethical considerations are both a means and an end to assuring the promotion of the neoconservative concept of the ‘national interest.’

This paper begins with a depiction of the neoconservative understanding of the ‘national interest,’ including the stature bestowed upon ethical considerations such as democracy promotion and human rights. This description also elaborates upon why ethical considerations were an integral component of the neoconservative strategic rationale for war, insofar as they were believed to strengthen U.S. security interests. Additionally, while neoconservative theory does value ethical considerations as an end goal, ethical claims also represent a means of achieving the national interest, by legitimising what the administration expected to be a unilateral and illegal intervention. By obscuring its ulterior motives and lending legitimacy to the Bush doctrine’s pursuit of regime change, ethical considerations are reminiscent of Plato’s favoured concept among notable neoconservatives (Drury 2003), of the ‘noble lie.’ The ‘noble lie’ represents a story with perhaps misleading or fictitious details, at the heart of which lies a profound truth (ibid). Paraphrased by former Secretary of Defence, and renowned neoconservative Donald Rumsfeld, in regard to the Iraq war, ‘strategic truths sometimes need to be defended by a “bodyguard of lies”’ (Mason 2004:1). In this capacity ethical justifications were utilised by the Bush administration to deflect criticism, appeal to a domestic audience and legitimise an unsanctioned regime change. The profound truth of the Bush administration’s ‘noble lie’ is that ethical considerations are an important end goal of the neoconservative agenda, as well as the means used to legitimate their genuine, but ultimately misguided, motives.

Neoconservatism: Idealism with Teeth²

Ethical considerations were by no means the earliest or most prominent justifications for war given by the Bush administration. Although Saddam’s cruelty and tyranny were often mentioned, it was only in the absence of evidence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties to Al Qaeda that ideological justifications came to the fore. This fact prompted speculation among scholars and the media alike, that the U.S.’s true motives were rooted in the selfish promotion of national interests, predominately understood as the wealth generated from control of Iraqi oil supplies. While assuring access to a reliable source of oil no doubt factored into the decision to go to war, Hakan Tunc (2005) is correct to point out that America could have both satisfied oil companies, and its long-term needs for oil by lifting sanctions on Iraq’s oil sales and cutting deals with Saddam (338). Instead, US foreign policy during this period is a reflection of the neoconservative understanding of the ‘national interest’ which combines realist demonstrations of American power and resolve, with idealist notions of democracy promotion and human rights (ibid: 350).

Francis Fukuyama (2006) describes three tenets of neoconservatism as: a concern with ideology and the internal politics of states; ‘a belief that American power can be used for moral purposes’; and scepticism towards the efficacy of international law and organisations. Such a calibration of beliefs necessarily results in a very particular understanding of the national interest. Neoconservatives pride themselves on going beyond its ‘narrow, too literal definition’ and looking towards a national interest ‘defined by a sense of national destiny…not a myopic national security’ (Kristol 1983: xii). As the “Godfather of neoconservatism,” Irving Kristol explains, that since the U.S. is a large, powerful nation whose identity is ideological in nature, the national interest must inevitably also be ideological, in addition to the more traditional material concerns of states (Kristol 2003: 25). Previous to the Iraq war his son William Kristol, in considering whether this posture would provoke animosity from the rest of the world, concluded that ‘[it] is precisely because American foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality that other nations find they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power’ (Fukuyama 2006). Thus, this pre-occupation with idealism is also believed by neoconservatives to confer specific strategic benefits to the U.S. ‘In other words, this was idealism not for its own sake, but was closely linked to a strategic imperative of reducing terrorist impulses associated with radical ideas. The neoconservatives believed that replacing the Saddam regime with a democratically elected government was central to a political transformation of the entire Middle East […]’ (Tunc 2005: 347).

The idealistic strategic rationale for war was expressed clearly by many members of the administration. Bush suggested that ‘I think a free Iraq is going to influence Iran . . . I think [war on terrorism] is a long-lasting ideological struggle,’ (Tunc 2005: 349) and Vice President Cheney declared that ‘[w]hen the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace […] Extremists in the region [will] have to rethink their strategy of Jihad’ (Cheney 2002). For neoconservatives, the greatest strategic advantage of ethical considerations is that, in the words of Congressman Newt Gingrich, ‘the advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world’ (Simes 2003). Beyond just striking a blow against international terrorism, neoconservative theory suggests that ethical considerations contribute to the strategic concept of “bandwagoning”, or “reverse-domino theory.” Hence, the strategic benefit of ideology is that other hostile states in the region, facing overt displays of American dominance, ‘will jump on the American bandwagon rather than risk death’ (Mearsheimer 2005: 2). The believed strategic benefits of the institutionalization of democracy and human rights, across the Middle East, as a result of bandwagoning are two-fold: first, neoconservative theory suggests that democracies are usually U.S.-friendly (Tunc 2005: 348), and second in free and democratic societies radicalism and Jihadism loose their appeal. Thus, ‘the goal of spreading democracy and freedom was then a strategic US interest, not only a moralistic policy’ (ibid).

Criticising such an approach to foreign policy Dimitri Simes (2003) posits that ‘the principal problem [with neoconservatism] is the mistaken belief that democracy is a talisman for all the world's ills, including terrorism, and that the United States has a responsibility to promote democratic government wherever in the world it is lacking.’ In suggesting that neoconservatives feel a need to intervene in the name of ethical considerations everywhere on earth, Simes has greatly misinterpreted the neoconservative attitude toward ethics and intervention; after all, neoconservatism is meant to be idealism with teeth. Answering the question of where to intervene and where to bring democracy, the noted neoconservative theorist Charles Krauthammer (2004a) has proposed a single criterion: where it counts. According to Krauthammer the neoconservative axiom is that, ‘[we] will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is strategic necessity’ (ibid). Therefore, although ethical considerations are of prime concern to the neoconservative agenda, they are only directly linked to foreign policy and intervention when they confer strategic advantage. The reason for this posture is that neoconservative theory surmises that ideological interventions will only succeed, when the strategic benefits are great and correctly perceived domestically as such. As examples, Krauthammer cites the unsuccessful interventions in Haiti and Somalia, insisting that ‘we failed because we correctly understood that nation-building is a huge task and that these places were not remotely worth the cost’ (Krauthammer 2004b: 23).

Thus, ethical considerations influenced the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, because in addition to the ideological strategic benefits wagered, there was a great deal of material reward at stake as well. Neoconservatism, seeks to use the U.S.’s vast military supremacy to support its security interests and ethical considerations simultaneously. Ultimately, regime change in Iraq looked, according to the neoconservatives, as having all the makings of a noble and successful intervention. Convinced of the rightness and strategic advantage of regime change, obtaining international approval ceased to be ‘a high priority for the White House, which believed that it would be vindicated by military success’ (Rubin 2003). In anticipation of a unilateral and possibly illegal intervention, ethical considerations also served as an important means to legitimise regime change, deflect criticism, and appeal to a domestic audience.

The Responsibility to Pre-empt

Much of the criticism that the U.S. faced before and after the war has been based on the concern that the U.S. was determined to go to war in Iraq, regardless of international sanctions or support in favour of the intervention. In fact, this is probably true given the strategic and military rewards of intervention promised by neoconservatives. As William Kristol declared in August of 2002, ‘[t]he debate in the administration is over. The time for action grows near.’ However the administration recognized that such bellicose determination would not be viewed favourably by the international community or the domestic electorate. Consequentially, the administration felt it necessary to use, in Paul Wolfowitz’s words, ‘murky’ evidence to justify force (Ignatieff 2003), and ethical claims to legitimise its actions. Similar to Plato’s concession that ‘noble lies’ are sometimes necessary to ‘help secure legitimacy for [the] Republic’ (Archard 1995: 473), there can be little debate that ‘in justifying his actions to the American people, the president was, at the least, economical with the truth’ (Ignatieff 2003).

Bush’s aggressively neoconservative doctrine as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy paved the way for the possibility of unprecedented pre-emptive action in the Middle East. Even in the absence of UN approval or international support, the administration understood that greater legitimacy would minimise resentment towards American forces in Iraq and the Middle East (Rubin 2003). Thus, although determined to depose the regime, the administration also sought to use ethical justifications to legitimise unsanctioned pre-emptive action. Ethical concerns are a highly viable justifaction for pre-emption considering the many recent humanitarian interventions which have proceeded without UN Security Council authorisation. Largely accepted without criticism as legitimate by international society, they include the 2001 South African intervention in Burundi, the 2002 multinational force in the Central African Republic, as well as the French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. In fact in the same year as the 2003 war in Iraq, four other interventions were launched, without UN approval, in the name of ethical considerations: the African Union intervention in Burundi, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the EU operation in Macedonia, and the Australian-led intervention in the Solomon Islands (Bellamy 2004). The U.S.’s own experience with Kosovo in 1999 suggested that UN approval was not essential to legitimately and violently intervene. In fact a commission of experts, reflecting on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s war in Kosovo found the conflict to be ‘illegal but legitimate’ (ibid), a view that Alex Bellamy (2004) suggests ‘accurately reflects sentiment in international society.’

In Nicholas Wheeler’s seminal work on the subject, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (2000), he proposes that there is a legitimate ‘“humanitarian exception” to the non-intervention rule’ (162). The corollary to this suggestion, proposed by the UN is “The Responsibility to Protect.” This principal holds that ‘UN member states have a responsibility to protect the lives, liberty, and basic human rights of their citizens, and that if they fail or are unable to carry it out, the international community has a responsibility to step in’ (Feinstein & Slaughter 2004). The U.S. administration might reasonably have assumed that emphasising ethical considerations would legitimise their drive for war, even in the absence of direct UN endorsement. The Bush administration might also have concluded, based on the lessons of past interventions, that although their motives may be doubted prior to the intervention, vindication would follow their victory. Similar to this argument is Wheeler’s (2000) suggestion that the motives of interveners are less important, when judging the legitimacy of an intervention, than the positive humanitarian outcomes that are achieved (38). This principal, legitimises interventions where humanitarian outcomes where achieved despite the ulterior motives of the interveners. India’s intervention into East Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of 1971, Vietnam’s overthrow of Pol Pot’s murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania’s use of force, ostensibly to repel an invasion by Uganda in 1978-79, which ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the brutal dictator Idi Amin, are all relevant examples (Heinze 2006: 23). In this capacity, the US administration hoped that its declared ethical justifications would provide ex post facto international legitimacy to their intervention.

Although ethical considerations played a large part in the US’s attempt to justify intervention to the world, its nearly-unilateral actions, with little outright support from the international community demonstrate that international perception is not a pressing concern to the neoconservative agenda. On balance, neoconservatives are supicious of multilateralism, and the possibility of being constrained by outside states. However, this lack of concern does not extend to domestic audiences who, to paraphrase Krauthammer, must correctly perceive the magnitude of the stakes involved in the neoconservative agenda (2004b: 23). The American public found Bush’s warnings that their security was directly at risk to be the most compelling rationale for war; (Pfiffner 2004) however, suspecting that evidence of WMD or ties to Al Qaeda might not be forthcoming, the Bush administration relied on ethical considerations to bolster its support. Anatol Lieven (2004) notes that the years surrounding the Iraq war have witnessed an American people ‘more sharply and evenly divided along party lines than at any time in modern American history’ (3). Consequently, ethical concerns were an ideal means to unite support for the Bush administration’s efforts. Lieven further suggests that principles of human rights and democracy are the foundation of American civic nationalism, and are held with ‘almost religious fervour,’ having the special role of holding a disparate nation together (ibid). According to Kristol there is a strong revolutionary element to American patriotism that ‘arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness,’ and ‘a sense of national destiny’ (1983: xii). The American public is thus highly receptive to ethical considerations, and in the lead up to the Iraq war were willing to forgive the administration’s inability to produce direct evidence that their security was in jeopardy. Stated more critically, although the plan was ‘megalomaniac, completely impracticable […] and totally unacceptable to most of the world. Because, however, this programme was expressed in traditional American nationalist terms of self-defence and the messianic role of the US in spreading freedom, many Americans found it entirely acceptable, and indeed natural’ (Lieven 2004: 5).

Conclusion

‘History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people’ (Bush 2002: 3).

‘History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act’ (Bush 2002: ii).

The 2002 National Security Strategy speaks of history as a living, judging deity, and accordingly, the Bush administration believed that an intervention cloaked in ethical considerations, and based on the strategic value of democracy and human rights, would find vindication when viewed with the ‘distance of history’ (ibid: 5). Supporting this belief, Heinze has written in 2006 that, ‘what matters, then, is whether the intervention in fact promotes human rights, not whether the resort to force was motivated entirely out of a desire to do so’ (Heinze 2006: 24). Considering this, it is relevant to note a unique, but often over-looked feature of Plato’s ‘noble lie,’ that indicates that both the citizens and their rulers are meant to believe it. Plato was ‘looking for a way to give citizens a sense of unity, and Guardians a reason to care for the common people as if they were their brothers’ (Garner 1993: 88). In the case of ethical considerations, it seems clear that both American citizens believed the ethical justifications for war, and the neoconservative administration believed that ethics were a primary motive at the heart of the intervention.

Accordingly, such a conclusion paints a different picture of Bush’s neoconservative agenda, than the one depicted by his harshest critics. Rather than an intervention ‘excoriated as an imperial misadventure, justified in the language of freedom and democracy but actually prosecuted for venal motives: oil, power, revenge, political advantage at home and nefarious designs abroad,’ (Ignatieff 2003) this essay suggests that neoconservative theory led to a misguided, but genuine, belief that the imposition of American values in the Middle East would result in enhanced American security, newfound allies, U.S. material advantage as well as a greater standard of living for all Iraqis. This ‘morally right, but politically wrong’ (Brown 2006) interpretation is by no means meant to mitigate the Bush administration’s culpability for their actions. That, their ethical motives were genuine holds little value in light of the escalating civil war in Iraq and the Iraq Study Group’s recent report stating that ‘the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success’ (Baker & Hamilton 2006); even ‘noble’ failures must be accounted for. A noted historian has suggested that the tension we sense in U.S. foreign policy ‘is not one between idealism and realism at all, but between competing conceptions of what is both moral and realistic’ (McDougall 1997: 9). In accounting for the prominent position ascribed by US officials to ethical considerations in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War, it seems clear that the neoconservative agenda was dominated heavily by American values, at the expense of what was realistic.

Ethical considerations were both a means and an end to achieving what the Bush administration believed to be ‘the national interest’ according to neoconservative theory. As Francis Fukuyama has asserted: ‘The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends […] but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them’ (Fukuyama 2006). The ‘distance of history’ (Bush 2002:5) that Bush spoke of prior to the war now reveals that violent deaths in Iraq occur at a rate three times of that previous to the invasion, (Bloomberg School of Public Health 2006) a consequence of a war justified with ethical considerations. It seems certain that the international community is not willing to vindicate the Bush administration’s ‘noble lie,’ and the question remains how history will judge a nation who’s conviction in the rightness of their beliefs resulted in a unilateral, and illegal invasion, costing the lives of more than half a million Iraqis, (ibid) twice as many as those directly linked to Saddam.

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1 Although difficult, such a position is not impossible to make. For a convincing argument that the war in Iraq constitutes a humanitarian intervention see Cushman 2005a.

2 This title is in reference to Mearsheimer’s (2005) description of neoconservatism as ‘Wilsonianism with teeth’ (1).

Riding a Tiger: making the most of the China threat theory in Outer Space.

Whoever controls outer space will also control the Earth.

(Jianqun 2006: 71)

‘The peaceful objective of China’s space exploration program is undisputable.’

(Dangen 2006: 60)

Introduction

The future of the political environment in outer space is unclear. There are those analysts who foresee a future that is both benign and development-oriented, while others judge space exploration as unavoidably antagonistic. Ultimately, the future seems predicated on those actors who control space, and their behaviour in it. Compounding this uncertainty is the ambiguity surrounding China’s intentions in space. ‘That China is so large and complex that one can look there for proof of any thesis, and find it, complicates the situation’ (Johnson-Freese 2003: 52). The China threat theory and the peaceful rise theory are the diametric theses most frequently employed to describe China’s behaviour. The latter is largely a Chinese construct in response to the predominantly American claims of a Chinese threat. Modern history has witnessed a Chinese space program focused on countering these accusations, by promoting and emphasizing its peaceful objectives.

January 11, 2007 witnessed a change in this posture, when a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile armed with a direct-ascent kinetic kill vehicle destroyed a defunct People’s Republic of China weather satellite (Mulvenon 2007:1). Even the most strident defenders of China’s peaceful rise struggled to explain this event in non-aggressive terms, while American advocates of the China threat saw their predictions finally confirmed. As this paper proposes, there has been utility for the U.S.’s adoption of the China threat theory and likewise, for China’s traditional response of claiming a peaceful rise. However, a possible explanation for China’s recent foray into space weaponry is that China is co-opting the China threat theory for its own benefit. As the only major space faring nation that the U.S. has excluded from its space cooperation strategy, China’s skilled use of the threat theory may indicate to the U.S. that the weaponisation of space has begun, and offer the alternative of binding non-proliferation agreements, ideally forcing the U.S.’s hand and compelling engagement.

This paper begins its argument with a description of the U.S.’s traditional China threat theory in space, based on the dual-use nature of technology, China’s lack of transparency and technological transfer. This is followed by an account of China’s contention of a peaceful rise, based on exploration, self-sufficiency, and defensive military applications. Finally, the proposition of how China is utilising the threat theory to its advantage is presented. As the Chinese idiom suggests ‘if riding a tiger, it is difficult to get off’ (QiHu NanXia; Solomone 2006: 322), and China’s actions are not without possible consequence. Its use of the threat theory may have the unintended effect of solidifying the U.S.’s concerns, and elevating the risk of a determined arms race in space. In order for China’s use of the threat theory to work to its advantage, the U.S. must feel equally compelled to adopt a non-traditional posture, thus finally accepting the possibility of China’s peaceful rise.

The U.S.’s Traditional Contention of China’s Threat in Space

Rather ironically, it was when China’s national strategy began to subordinate military development to economic development, and give precedence to domestic policies over external challenges, that the China threat theory was catalysed in the US. This strategy is embodied in the assertion of Wu Chunsi of Fudan University that: ‘Military and security considerations are certainly important to any country, but they are not the first priority in the current Chinese grand strategy’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 14). Rather, the Chinese leadership made a deliberate choice to undertake sweeping reforms that came to be understood as ‘Comprehensive Security,’ and had the unintended consequence of provoking the notion of China’s threat (Ong 2007: 4). In relation to China’s space program, the accusations of a China threat, came primarily in the 1990s from a small but influential group of congressional staffers, think-tank analysts and academics known as the “Blue Team,” ‘who vocally and voraciously viewed China as the next enemy’ (Johnson-Freese 2006: 42). Their perception of China’s threat in space was largely based on the dual-use nature of space technology, China’s political opaqueness, and fears of technological transfer.

It has been estimated that upwards of 95 percent of space technology has the dual-use ability of serving both civil and military purposes (Johnson-Freese 2006: 40). This feature of the outer space political environment is additionally complicated by the fact that military space technology designed for defensive purposes often is also suitable for offensive attacks. Consequently, a premium is placed on knowing an adversary’s intentions in space, although such knowledge is impossible to gauge with complete certainty. American political and military analysts have instead chosen to focus on the more empirically oriented and conservative notion of China’s capabilities in space, rather than its intentions. The China threat theory has also pushed the intelligence community to adopt austere criteria for projecting threat, often basing policy on China’s ‘possible capabilities’ instead of its ‘likely capabilities.’ As a result there is ‘nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for ‘possibly’ posing military threats to the United States’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 5).

The difficulty for the U.S. in gauging both China’s intentions and capabilities is further problemitised by its ‘cultural proclivities toward opaqueness…’ and ‘a military “abhorrence” of transparency traced back to Sun Tzu’ (Johnson-Freese 2006: 39). The China threat is given strength by the closed nature of the political system, and this is exacerbated in ‘space-related areas by often excessive security concerns common to authoritarian states’ (ibid). The cumulative effects of the China threat theory have left interaction on military space issues sparse, providing few opportunities for insights into China’s space program, thus feeding China’s suspicions of the US’s hostile intentions as well as a continued rejection of engagement by the U.S.

Sino-American relations worsened at the turn of the millennium as U.S. domestic and foreign policy increasingly expressed the China threat in concrete measures, often premised on the concern of technological transfer, or more accurately, China stealing technological secrets. The U.S. National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 decreed that satellites and other space materials be officially classified as munitions (making the U.S. the only country on earth to adopt such a stance) and falling under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), so as to protect American technology from easily exchanging hands with China (Xiaobing 2006: 74-75). This same year witnessed the publication of the Cox Commission Report, released by the U.S. House of Representatives, ‘which groundlessly alleged that China had stolen U.S. missile technologies’(Dangen 2006: 63). While, the Cox Commission report remains contested, there is certainly evidence to suggest that many features of the Chinese space program did not originate indigenously. ‘That their Xichang launch site is at approximately twenty-eight degrees north latitude and [Kennedy Space Centre] is at 28.5 degrees north is not a coincidence. The Chinese picked a similar latitude to allow emulation of American post-launch trajectories, which were described in some detail in open-source U.S. literature. (Johnson-Freese 2003: 58). This example is a far cry from substantiating allegations of deliberate technological transfer or espionage, but it does confirm the Blue Team’s concerns of China’s possible competitor status. Finally, perhaps the most damning event for Sino-American space relations emerged in 2001 from The Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld. The report warned of the menace to America of a new “Pearl Harbour” and pointed out that the ‘United States was facing competition in space and warned against potential attempts by other nations to restrict U.S. space activities through international regulations’ (FAS 2004: 37).

China’s Traditional Contention of a Peaceful Rise

With an almost mantra-like quality, China has historically countered the claims of American threat theory analysts by emphasising the objectives of its peaceful rise. These objectives, according to Premier Wen Jiabao, include the short and long term promotion of Chinese development based on indigenous strength and hard work, safeguarding world peace, continued ‘opening-up,’ and neither interfering with, nor threatening any other nation (Jiabao, 2003). As to the credibility of the China threat, promoters of the peaceful rise attribute the misunderstanding to cultural relativity and rightly point out that few Blue Team members are experts on China. ‘Very few of the other Washington-based activists concerned about the Chinese threat have degrees in Chinese studies or speak Chinese’ (Kaiser & Mufson 2000).

Space is an area that China sees itself as having once been dominant, but due to outside interference was prematurely surpassed. China is quick to remind the world that it ‘invented gunpowder, the “embryo of modern space rockets,”’ (Johnson-Freese 2003: 57) and now feels justified in regaining its place of distinction. Subsequently, as the American and Russian manned space programs were the embodiment of national spirit, China’s space program is more than just a technological feat. The Chinese people view exploratory ventures in space, like the Shenzhou manned space program similarly to the 2008 Olympic Games and its accession to the World Trade Organization, as symbols of the nation’s strength (Jianqun 2006: 68). American accusations that the Shenzhou program could serve the dual-use purpose of acting as a launch vehicle for an advanced ballistic missile are met with disbelief from the Chinese. They correctly point out that the Long March-2F carrier rocket used by the Shenzhou program is liquid-fueled and requires approximately 20 hours to fuel, which is little threat to U.S. and Russian mobile, solid-fuel strategic missiles, which can be launched in minutes (Dangen 2006:61).

Unlike the U.S. which views the dual-use capacity of space technology as problematic, China is among a host of nations, including Europe, that view this capacity as an opportunity. China’s space program is an integral facet of its comprehensive development strategy despite clear military involvement; it became clear very early on that a well-developed space program was beyond the financial means of the military. Unlike the US, a lack of resources to devote to space has compelled the military to ‘substantially divest itself from development and production and become highly reliant on market oriented activities […]’ (Hagt 2006: 90). Fortunately, the ratio of financial input to output of space and supporting industries ranges from about 1:2 to 1:14 (Dangen 2006: 59). Civil space development and exploration have thus revitalized China’s share of the international satellite launch market and ‘economic returns from Chinese industries related to the space program have already reached 120 billion RMB’ (Dangen 2006: 60). Additionally, the civilian applications of this technology are increasingly contributing to the standard of living in China, including precision navigation, meteorological forecasting, disaster warning, as well as space-tested seeds with dramatically improved yields that promise to help convert China’s vast deserts into arable land (ibid)¹.

In response to accusations that China is willing to steal technology from the US, to promote these development goals, China defensively argues that a guiding principle of its peaceful rise is self-reliance and attaining independent intellectual property rights for space technology. ‘Furthermore, it would be difficult to integrate outside technology with China’s own, as China has developed its own standards for rockets and satellites’ (Xiaobing 2006: 82).

Despite the prevalence of civilian space technology, military involvement in China’s space program remains inevitable, particularly in light of dual-use technology. While China does not deny this, it does suggest that it wishes for its military space development to remain entirely defensive. ‘Chinese military thinkers are after all, still influenced by a particular strand in ancient military thought; the famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote around 400 B.C. that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’ (Ong 2007: 6). Of the utmost importance to many Chinese officials is maintaining the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent. Consequently, the threat of space weaponisation must not be allowed to disturb the balance of the global non-proliferation regime. In June of 2002, China, together with the Russian Federation² submitted a working paper³ to the Conference of Disarmament (CD). The document acknowledged the dual-use nature of space assets as well as the fact that ‘it would seem impossible for the U.S. to give up its missile defense,’ (Chunsi 2006: 113) so while banning weaponisation, it allowed for the use of certain defensive and peaceful military applications. Although being well received by the international community, the U.S. has continually blocked efforts to develop these policies into legally binding treaties.

After several decades of defending its peaceful rise, the January 11, 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test seems to be a dramatic change of behaviour for China. Advocates of the China threat were quick to interpret an implied offensive threat or worse, suggesting the possibility that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had become a ‘rogue warrior’ (Mulvenon 2007). But considering China’s growing dependence on it’s own space assets, making it possibly the most strategically vulnerable of all the major powers (Hagt 2006: 91), a more likely interpretation is that China increasingly finds less utility in the peaceful rise theory, and has found a means to co-opt the China threat theory. In 2001 Rumsfeld’s Space Commission Report stated that space was destined to become the battleground of the future and that the U.S. would be remiss not to prepare. This year also marked the first U.S. space war game simulation, where the U.S. forces battled a large opponent threatening a small island neighbour about the same size and location as Taiwan (Johnson-Freese 2006: 52). Clearly, the passive role that China has maintained thus far has not served to encourage U.S. engagement or deflect U.S. hostilities. Russell Ong (2007) has suggested that overall, the China threat theory serves the utility of giving policymakers in the West ‘a convenient framework for formulating their China policies,’ and further, ‘provides some justification for those policymakers who wish to adopt a containment policy towards China.’ (10). It is in light of this fact that China has begun to discover its own utility in the China threat theory.

China’s Adoption of the Threat Theory

The Chinese, with regards to outer space, have historically believed that, ‘the first and best option […was] to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from [weaponising]’ (Hui 2006:26). As Hu Xiaodi, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs explained: ‘If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponisation, as suggested by China’ (Xiaodi 2001). John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and non-proliferation, has countered these Chinese overtures by declaring to the CD that: ‘the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements’ (Hui 2006:29). The basis for this position can essentially be described as: since no state other than the U.S. possesses the capability, the need to pursue multilateral treaties banning weaponisation is redundant.

China’s ASAT test is intended to provoke from the U.S. administration the same sense of urgency, and severity which the Chinese have long given to this issue. Emphasising the strategic urgency of binding legislation, Teng Jianqun (2006) accurately notes that the ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty took effect 30 years after the first use of nuclear weapons and its effectiveness has been severely weakened as a result.’ While this recent ASAT test may provoke an aggressive response from the US, it is likely that China’s use of the threat, is intended more to highlight the peaceful alternatives. In the weeks following the test, China frequently repeated the same phrase: ‘This test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country… [China] opposes the weaponisation of space and arms races in space’ (Buckley 2007). These statements were quickly followed by the legal caveat that the ‘recent satellite-related test did not violate any international treaty’ (‘PRC FM Spokesman’ 2007). China has skilfully and legally applied the threat in such a way as to exaggerate the need and desirability of binding treaties preventing further ASAT tests. What China’s space program to date has indicated, is that the U.S.’s continued isolation and exclusion will only deepen China’s suspicion and resentment of the US, possibly pushing the commercial and civilian sectors of China’s space program to seek renewed alliances with the military (Chunsi 2006: 110).

China threat theorists reject this interpretation of China’s behaviour. They instead suggest that China’s promotion of international treaties ‘is merely the gambit of a country still playing catch-up, with the purpose of constraining U.S. political freedom to act in space while China continues to develop its own weapon systems to destroy American space assets’ (Hagt 2006: 92). They further note that since the CD has been in a state of suspended animation, without even a working agenda since 1996, China can comfortably propose treaties that it has no intention of ever conforming to. Ironically, this suspicion may be based on the U.S.’s prior experiences in which it developed the F-15 ASAT while simultaneously pushing the Russians to negotiate a complete ASAT ban (Hagt 2006). The accusations are also ironic considering it is the US, not China that is the principal country blocking the CD agenda. Should the American administration truly believe that China is using the treaty as a ploy, the U.S. is the only state capable of calling China’s bluff, and attempting to engage it (Hagt 2006: 96).

The U.S.’s Adoption of the Peaceful Rise Theory

In the sense that China may not be able to control the political fallout from its recent ASAT test, its manipulation of the threat theory is much like riding a tiger. Well before the recent ASAT test, Zhang Hui (2006) predicted that if Chinese efforts at multilateral agreements failed, it’s most likely response would be to counter and neutralize the threat posed by the U.S. weaponisation of space, most likely in the form of ASAT weapons. Further, he predicted that this would inevitably lead to an arms race in space (25). If an arms race is to be avoided, provoked by China’s recent use of threat, America must likewise adopt a non-traditional posture. In this case the U.S. must find utility in the concept of China’s peaceful rise. This position will involve compromising its current pursuit of space hegemony, but ultimately is also more likely to serve U.S. national interests.

Certainly, the antagonistic and suspicious nature of the current relationship will necessitate incremental revisions. However, as both U.S. and Chinese space activities can be classified into civil, commercial, defence and intelligence applications, it is likely that despite the dual-use character of the technology, cooperation on at least civilian and commercial projects is still possible (Chunsi 2006: 110). From an economic perspective, research indicates that the U.S. efforts to isolate and retard China’s space program have only ‘[stimulated] China’s indigenous space industry, [driven] European companies into closer cooperation with China, and hurt the U.S. aerospace industry on which the U.S. military increasingly depends’ (Blair & Yali 2006: 7). If the U.S. began to engage notions of China’s peaceful rise and make greater use of China’s launch capacity in the next five years, then it stands to gain possibly $8 billion USD worth of benefits and 16,000 job opportunities to the U.S. space industry (Xiaobing 2006: 82). The U.S. containment policy towards China has made it impossible for U.S. satellite manufacturers to take advantage of the increasingly cheap and reliable services in China. The nature of the ITAR treats any satellites, foreign or domestic, with any American-made components as falling under U.S. export restrictions. Consequently, countries from Europe to Russia to Brazil, ‘regard the American policy of isolating China’s space program as draconian, and the export restrictions as excessive’ (Blair & Yali 2006:10). Increasingly, the international space industry is shunning the U.S. market in favour of ‘“ITAR Free,” meaning that no components of U.S.-origin were used, and therefore the satellite [is] not subject to U.S. export laws’ (Johnson-Freese 2006b: 142).

The U.S., unlike China, views space as a zero-sum game; this myopic assessment of outer space has been justified in the increasingly obsolete jargon of the China threat theory. In reality, isolating China’s military threat involves engaging China’s integration into the international community. The utility of encouraging cooperation and entertaining China’s peaceful rise is especially profound when considering the U.S.’s historic track record of emphasising the value of space cooperation. ‘Cooperation with Europe delayed European entry into the commercial launch sweepstakes until the U.S. overreached for control. Japan too was initially deterred from building indigenous launchers, instead licensing technology from the United States. The licensing agreements not only gave the U.S. control over what was launched, but reaped financial rewards for U.S. companies as well’ (Johnson-Freese 2006B: 144). Perhaps setting the greatest precedent, was the U.S.’s enlistment of Russia into the International Space Station, which thankfully ‘kept Russian rocket scientists from turning up on the international employment market as missile specialists’ (ibid).

Finally, the advantages to the U.S. of the China threat theory, as well as space weaponisation are questionable. Evidence from the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research indicates that the strategic benefit of space-based weapons is highly exaggerated. In fact, ground-based weapons are in many ways more effective. ‘The high costs of developing, testing and deploying space weapons, the difficulty of subsequent calibration, maintenance and repair, and the arms race that would likely ensue compare especially unfavourably with the greater security, commercial and other benefits of a legally regulated weapons-free outer space’ (UNIDIR 2004: 14-15).

Conclusion

In many ways the China threat theory represents a tiger that both the U.S. and China may find difficult to let go of. If China’s recent actions provoke a heightened military response from the US, China will be obliged to resort with counter threats, and the possibility of an arms race looms. Likewise, the threat theory has been such an intrinsic part of the U.S.’s containment policy towards China, both in international relations, and in outer space, that it may be difficult to embrace China’s peaceful rise. ‘Perhaps not coincidentally, space…remains one of the last venues of Cold War thinking, with assets considered so important that zero-sum thinking prevails’ (Johnson-Freese 2006: 51). However, international headlines increasingly indicate reasons for optimism and the possibility of improving Sino-American relations: ‘The two nations have been cooperating closely in the global war against terror, the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula, and on global security. Bilateral economic ties are closer than ever [… the] characterization of China as a stakeholder instead of strategic competitor is accurate’ (Xiaobing 2006: 82). The US, and now China, have found utility in exaggerating China’s threat, and it has thus far resulted only in further isolation and aggression. For the sake of peaceful relations on earth and in space, it is now time for the two nations to stop riding the threat theory and instead embrace the possibility of China’s peaceful rise. If these powerful nations can achieve mutual understanding and cooperation in space, there is hope that they might achieve it on earth as well.

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1 Ajay Lele (2005) has gone as far as to suggest that China is willing to compromise its international posture on Taiwan for the sake of these economic development goals, based on China’s continued relations with the island of Kiribati. While China as a matter of policy, refuses ties with nations that recognize Taiwan, Kiribati although formally acknowledging Taiwan and developing diplomatic relations in 2003, also hosts one of China’s space tracking stations. Quite simply, China was not willing to lose a major space asset over the issue of repatriation (71).

2 Along with Indonesia, Belarus, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe and Syria

3 “Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Objects”