The Noble Lie: ethical considerations and the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War
‘The 2003 war in Iraq is important because it represents the first
time a group of intervening states have justified their actions by referring to the humanitarian outcomes that were produced by acts primarily motivated by non-humanitarian concerns’ (Bellamy 2004)
Introduction
Although there can be no doubt of Saddam Hussein’s “vicious inhumanity,” in light of the quarter of a million murdered or “disappeared” Iraqis during his last twenty-five years of Ba’th Party rule, there is also little dispute that by March 2003 Hussein’s killings were waning (Roth 2004). As many critics of the war are increasingly eager to note, justifying the war in Iraq as a ‘humanitarian intervention’ is a difficult case to make. In fact, several of the most respected humanitarian organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have criticised the US administration’s humanitarian claims, suggesting that they threaten the legitimacy of future ‘valid’ humanitarian interventions (ibid). However, without casting judgement on whether the 2003 war in Iraq was a ‘humanitarian intervention’, the question remains as to why US officials ascribed such a prominent position to ethical considerations in the lead up to the war. The most prominent and critical explanation proposes that U.S. ethical claims were merely a ‘smokescreen created by Bush in order to camouflage other secret goals in Iraq,’ (Tunc 2005: 348) namely oil and imperial expansion.
Like all conflicts, a number of factors undoubtedly motivated the U.S. administration’s decision to go to war, and as Michael Ignatieff (2003) has judiciously suggested, ‘oil is not the whole story.’ As this essay contends, using ethical considerations to legitimise actual strategic motives is an important, but not complete, depiction of the Bush administration’s neoconservative agenda. While justifying intervention in Iraq on the basis of the democratic freedoms and human rights of Iraqis, may have been a means to obscure the U.S.’s bellicose ulterior motives, ethical considerations are also a primary goal and an intrinsic facet of the neoconservative theory reflected in the Bush doctrine (Mearsheimer 2005: 1). The 2002 National Security Strategy clearly promotes a foreign policy ‘that reflects the union of our values and our national interests’ (Bush 2002: 1). Thus the neoconservative idea that ‘effectively link[s] morality […]’ in the form of human rights and democracy, ‘to a strategic purpose (defeating terrorism)’ (Heinze 2006: 21) played an important role in the decision to intervene in Iraq. Consequently, ethical considerations are both a means and an end to assuring the promotion of the neoconservative concept of the ‘national interest.’
This paper begins with a depiction of the neoconservative understanding of the ‘national interest,’ including the stature bestowed upon ethical considerations such as democracy promotion and human rights. This description also elaborates upon why ethical considerations were an integral component of the neoconservative strategic rationale for war, insofar as they were believed to strengthen U.S. security interests. Additionally, while neoconservative theory does value ethical considerations as an end goal, ethical claims also represent a means of achieving the national interest, by legitimising what the administration expected to be a unilateral and illegal intervention. By obscuring its ulterior motives and lending legitimacy to the Bush doctrine’s pursuit of regime change, ethical considerations are reminiscent of Plato’s favoured concept among notable neoconservatives (Drury 2003), of the ‘noble lie.’ The ‘noble lie’ represents a story with perhaps misleading or fictitious details, at the heart of which lies a profound truth (ibid). Paraphrased by former Secretary of Defence, and renowned neoconservative Donald Rumsfeld, in regard to the Iraq war, ‘strategic truths sometimes need to be defended by a “bodyguard of lies”’ (Mason 2004:1). In this capacity ethical justifications were utilised by the Bush administration to deflect criticism, appeal to a domestic audience and legitimise an unsanctioned regime change. The profound truth of the Bush administration’s ‘noble lie’ is that ethical considerations are an important end goal of the neoconservative agenda, as well as the means used to legitimate their genuine, but ultimately misguided, motives.
Neoconservatism: Idealism with Teeth
Ethical considerations were by no means the earliest or most prominent justifications for war given by the Bush administration. Although Saddam’s cruelty and tyranny were often mentioned, it was only in the absence of evidence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties to Al Qaeda that ideological justifications came to the fore. This fact prompted speculation among scholars and the media alike, that the U.S.’s true motives were rooted in the selfish promotion of national interests, predominately understood as the wealth generated from control of Iraqi oil supplies. While assuring access to a reliable source of oil no doubt factored into the decision to go to war, Hakan Tunc (2005) is correct to point out that America could have both satisfied oil companies, and its long-term needs for oil by lifting sanctions on Iraq’s oil sales and cutting deals with Saddam (338). Instead, US foreign policy during this period is a reflection of the neoconservative understanding of the ‘national interest’ which combines realist demonstrations of American power and resolve, with idealist notions of democracy promotion and human rights (ibid: 350).
Francis Fukuyama (2006) describes three tenets of neoconservatism as: a concern with ideology and the internal politics of states; ‘a belief that American power can be used for moral purposes’; and scepticism towards the efficacy of international law and organisations. Such a calibration of beliefs necessarily results in a very particular understanding of the national interest. Neoconservatives pride themselves on going beyond its ‘narrow, too literal definition’ and looking towards a national interest ‘defined by a sense of national destiny…not a myopic national security’ (Kristol 1983: xii). As the “Godfather of neoconservatism,” Irving Kristol explains, that since the U.S. is a large, powerful nation whose identity is ideological in nature, the national interest must inevitably also be ideological, in addition to the more traditional material concerns of states (Kristol 2003: 25). Previous to the Iraq war his son William Kristol, in considering whether this posture would provoke animosity from the rest of the world, concluded that ‘[it] is precisely because American foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality that other nations find they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power’ (Fukuyama 2006). Thus, this pre-occupation with idealism is also believed by neoconservatives to confer specific strategic benefits to the U.S. ‘In other words, this was idealism not for its own sake, but was closely linked to a strategic imperative of reducing terrorist impulses associated with radical ideas. The neoconservatives believed that replacing the Saddam regime with a democratically elected government was central to a political transformation of the entire Middle East […]’ (Tunc 2005: 347).
The idealistic strategic rationale for war was expressed clearly by many members of the administration. Bush suggested that ‘I think a free Iraq is going to influence Iran . . . I think [war on terrorism] is a long-lasting ideological struggle,’ (Tunc 2005: 349) and Vice President Cheney declared that ‘[w]hen the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace […] Extremists in the region [will] have to rethink their strategy of Jihad’ (Cheney 2002). For neoconservatives, the greatest strategic advantage of ethical considerations is that, in the words of Congressman Newt Gingrich, ‘the advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world’ (Simes 2003). Beyond just striking a blow against international terrorism, neoconservative theory suggests that ethical considerations contribute to the strategic concept of “bandwagoning”, or “reverse-domino theory.” Hence, the strategic benefit of ideology is that other hostile states in the region, facing overt displays of American dominance, ‘will jump on the American bandwagon rather than risk death’ (Mearsheimer 2005: 2). The believed strategic benefits of the institutionalization of democracy and human rights, across the Middle East, as a result of bandwagoning are two-fold: first, neoconservative theory suggests that democracies are usually U.S.-friendly (Tunc 2005: 348), and second in free and democratic societies radicalism and Jihadism loose their appeal. Thus, ‘the goal of spreading democracy and freedom was then a strategic US interest, not only a moralistic policy’ (ibid).
Criticising such an approach to foreign policy Dimitri Simes (2003) posits that ‘the principal problem [with neoconservatism] is the mistaken belief that democracy is a talisman for all the world's ills, including terrorism, and that the United States has a responsibility to promote democratic government wherever in the world it is lacking.’ In suggesting that neoconservatives feel a need to intervene in the name of ethical considerations everywhere on earth, Simes has greatly misinterpreted the neoconservative attitude toward ethics and intervention; after all, neoconservatism is meant to be idealism with teeth. Answering the question of where to intervene and where to bring democracy, the noted neoconservative theorist Charles Krauthammer (2004a) has proposed a single criterion: where it counts. According to Krauthammer the neoconservative axiom is that, ‘[we] will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is strategic necessity’ (ibid). Therefore, although ethical considerations are of prime concern to the neoconservative agenda, they are only directly linked to foreign policy and intervention when they confer strategic advantage. The reason for this posture is that neoconservative theory surmises that ideological interventions will only succeed, when the strategic benefits are great and correctly perceived domestically as such. As examples, Krauthammer cites the unsuccessful interventions in Haiti and Somalia, insisting that ‘we failed because we correctly understood that nation-building is a huge task and that these places were not remotely worth the cost’ (Krauthammer 2004b: 23).
Thus, ethical considerations influenced the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, because in addition to the ideological strategic benefits wagered, there was a great deal of material reward at stake as well. Neoconservatism, seeks to use the U.S.’s vast military supremacy to support its security interests and ethical considerations simultaneously. Ultimately, regime change in Iraq looked, according to the neoconservatives, as having all the makings of a noble and successful intervention. Convinced of the rightness and strategic advantage of regime change, obtaining international approval ceased to be ‘a high priority for the White House, which believed that it would be vindicated by military success’ (Rubin 2003). In anticipation of a unilateral and possibly illegal intervention, ethical considerations also served as an important means to legitimise regime change, deflect criticism, and appeal to a domestic audience.
The Responsibility to Pre-empt
Much of the criticism that the U.S. faced before and after the war has been based on the concern that the U.S. was determined to go to war in Iraq, regardless of international sanctions or support in favour of the intervention. In fact, this is probably true given the strategic and military rewards of intervention promised by neoconservatives. As William Kristol declared in August of 2002, ‘[t]he debate in the administration is over. The time for action grows near.’ However the administration recognized that such bellicose determination would not be viewed favourably by the international community or the domestic electorate. Consequentially, the administration felt it necessary to use, in Paul Wolfowitz’s words, ‘murky’ evidence to justify force (Ignatieff 2003), and ethical claims to legitimise its actions. Similar to Plato’s concession that ‘noble lies’ are sometimes necessary to ‘help secure legitimacy for [the] Republic’ (Archard 1995: 473), there can be little debate that ‘in justifying his actions to the American people, the president was, at the least, economical with the truth’ (Ignatieff 2003).
Bush’s aggressively neoconservative doctrine as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy paved the way for the possibility of unprecedented pre-emptive action in the Middle East. Even in the absence of UN approval or international support, the administration understood that greater legitimacy would minimise resentment towards American forces in Iraq and the Middle East (Rubin 2003). Thus, although determined to depose the regime, the administration also sought to use ethical justifications to legitimise unsanctioned pre-emptive action. Ethical concerns are a highly viable justifaction for pre-emption considering the many recent humanitarian interventions which have proceeded without UN Security Council authorisation. Largely accepted without criticism as legitimate by international society, they include the 2001 South African intervention in Burundi, the 2002 multinational force in the Central African Republic, as well as the French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. In fact in the same year as the 2003 war in Iraq, four other interventions were launched, without UN approval, in the name of ethical considerations: the African Union intervention in Burundi, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, the EU operation in Macedonia, and the Australian-led intervention in the Solomon Islands (Bellamy 2004). The U.S.’s own experience with Kosovo in 1999 suggested that UN approval was not essential to legitimately and violently intervene. In fact a commission of experts, reflecting on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s war in Kosovo found the conflict to be ‘illegal but legitimate’ (ibid), a view that Alex Bellamy (2004) suggests ‘accurately reflects sentiment in international society.’
In Nicholas Wheeler’s seminal work on the subject, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (2000), he proposes that there is a legitimate ‘“humanitarian exception” to the non-intervention rule’ (162). The corollary to this suggestion, proposed by the UN is “The Responsibility to Protect.” This principal holds that ‘UN member states have a responsibility to protect the lives, liberty, and basic human rights of their citizens, and that if they fail or are unable to carry it out, the international community has a responsibility to step in’ (Feinstein & Slaughter 2004). The U.S. administration might reasonably have assumed that emphasising ethical considerations would legitimise their drive for war, even in the absence of direct UN endorsement. The Bush administration might also have concluded, based on the lessons of past interventions, that although their motives may be doubted prior to the intervention, vindication would follow their victory. Similar to this argument is Wheeler’s (2000) suggestion that the motives of interveners are less important, when judging the legitimacy of an intervention, than the positive humanitarian outcomes that are achieved (38). This principal, legitimises interventions where humanitarian outcomes where achieved despite the ulterior motives of the interveners. India’s intervention into East Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of 1971, Vietnam’s overthrow of Pol Pot’s murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzania’s use of force, ostensibly to repel an invasion by Uganda in 1978-79, which ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the brutal dictator Idi Amin, are all relevant examples (Heinze 2006: 23). In this capacity, the US administration hoped that its declared ethical justifications would provide ex post facto international legitimacy to their intervention.
Although ethical considerations played a large part in the US’s attempt to justify intervention to the world, its nearly-unilateral actions, with little outright support from the international community demonstrate that international perception is not a pressing concern to the neoconservative agenda. On balance, neoconservatives are supicious of multilateralism, and the possibility of being constrained by outside states. However, this lack of concern does not extend to domestic audiences who, to paraphrase Krauthammer, must correctly perceive the magnitude of the stakes involved in the neoconservative agenda (2004b: 23). The American public found Bush’s warnings that their security was directly at risk to be the most compelling rationale for war; (Pfiffner 2004) however, suspecting that evidence of WMD or ties to Al Qaeda might not be forthcoming, the Bush administration relied on ethical considerations to bolster its support. Anatol Lieven (2004) notes that the years surrounding the Iraq war have witnessed an American people ‘more sharply and evenly divided along party lines than at any time in modern American history’ (3). Consequently, ethical concerns were an ideal means to unite support for the Bush administration’s efforts. Lieven further suggests that principles of human rights and democracy are the foundation of American civic nationalism, and are held with ‘almost religious fervour,’ having the special role of holding a disparate nation together (ibid). According to Kristol there is a strong revolutionary element to American patriotism that ‘arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness,’ and ‘a sense of national destiny’ (1983: xii). The American public is thus highly receptive to ethical considerations, and in the lead up to the Iraq war were willing to forgive the administration’s inability to produce direct evidence that their security was in jeopardy. Stated more critically, although the plan was ‘megalomaniac, completely impracticable […] and totally unacceptable to most of the world. Because, however, this programme was expressed in traditional American nationalist terms of self-defence and the messianic role of the US in spreading freedom, many Americans found it entirely acceptable, and indeed natural’ (Lieven 2004: 5).
Conclusion
‘History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people’ (Bush 2002: 3).
‘History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act’ (Bush 2002: ii).
The 2002 National Security Strategy speaks of history as a living, judging deity, and accordingly, the Bush administration believed that an intervention cloaked in ethical considerations, and based on the strategic value of democracy and human rights, would find vindication when viewed with the ‘distance of history’ (ibid: 5). Supporting this belief, Heinze has written in 2006 that, ‘what matters, then, is whether the intervention in fact promotes human rights, not whether the resort to force was motivated entirely out of a desire to do so’ (Heinze 2006: 24). Considering this, it is relevant to note a unique, but often over-looked feature of Plato’s ‘noble lie,’ that indicates that both the citizens and their rulers are meant to believe it. Plato was ‘looking for a way to give citizens a sense of unity, and Guardians a reason to care for the common people as if they were their brothers’ (Garner 1993: 88). In the case of ethical considerations, it seems clear that both American citizens believed the ethical justifications for war, and the neoconservative administration believed that ethics were a primary motive at the heart of the intervention.
Accordingly, such a conclusion paints a different picture of Bush’s neoconservative agenda, than the one depicted by his harshest critics. Rather than an intervention ‘excoriated as an imperial misadventure, justified in the language of freedom and democracy but actually prosecuted for venal motives: oil, power, revenge, political advantage at home and nefarious designs abroad,’ (Ignatieff 2003) this essay suggests that neoconservative theory led to a misguided, but genuine, belief that the imposition of American values in the Middle East would result in enhanced American security, newfound allies, U.S. material advantage as well as a greater standard of living for all Iraqis. This ‘morally right, but politically wrong’ (Brown 2006) interpretation is by no means meant to mitigate the Bush administration’s culpability for their actions. That, their ethical motives were genuine holds little value in light of the escalating civil war in Iraq and the Iraq Study Group’s recent report stating that ‘the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success’ (Baker & Hamilton 2006); even ‘noble’ failures must be accounted for. A noted historian has suggested that the tension we sense in U.S. foreign policy ‘is not one between idealism and realism at all, but between competing conceptions of what is both moral and realistic’ (McDougall 1997: 9). In accounting for the prominent position ascribed by US officials to ethical considerations in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War, it seems clear that the neoconservative agenda was dominated heavily by American values, at the expense of what was realistic.
Ethical considerations were both a means and an end to achieving what the Bush administration believed to be ‘the national interest’ according to neoconservative theory. As Francis Fukuyama has asserted: ‘The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends […] but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them’ (Fukuyama 2006). The ‘distance of history’ (Bush 2002:5) that Bush spoke of prior to the war now reveals that violent deaths in Iraq occur at a rate three times of that previous to the invasion, (Bloomberg School of Public Health 2006) a consequence of a war justified with ethical considerations. It seems certain that the international community is not willing to vindicate the Bush administration’s ‘noble lie,’ and the question remains how history will judge a nation who’s conviction in the rightness of their beliefs resulted in a unilateral, and illegal invasion, costing the lives of more than half a million Iraqis, (ibid) twice as many as those directly linked to Saddam.
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